Are Saraiki's of Baluch descent

dish

REASONS FOR DECISION:

I. Procedure:

I.1. The complainant (hereinafter referred to as "BF" for short), a citizen of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, filed an application for international protection on December 15, 2011.

Before the bodies of the public security service, the BF presented the following on December 15, 2011:

He is married and has the citizenship of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He belongs to the Hazara ethnic group and most recently worked as a teacher of physics and English (high school). His mother, wife and son would live in Pakistan.

When asked about the reason for fleeing, the BF stated that his life was in danger. He was a teacher and worked closely with an American organization (NGO). Not only the BF is in danger there, but the entire Hazara ethnic group - because they are Shiites. [File page (AS) 15 ff].

On March 26, 2012, the authority in question received a power of attorney from the legally friendly representative of the BF.

On April 11, 2012, the BF confirmed his previous information in front of an administrator of the authority concerned and also stated that he would like to state that he was not an Afghan but a Pakistani citizen. He presented a copy of his passport as proof. The passport is in Pakistan. The BF was born in XXXX, Afghanistan and left Afghanistan with his family when he was two years old. Relatives of the BF's father would have helped him to obtain Pakistani documents so that the BF's family would have become Pakistani citizens. The BF does not know how it came about that a place in Pakistan appears in his passport as the BF's birthplace. When asked about the name appearing in the passport, the BF stated that the family name would not be entered in the passport in Pakistan.

When asked about the reason for his escape, the BF stated that he was Hazara and Shiite. He is also a teacher. In XXXX, where he lived, the Hazare are not wanted and are under great pressure there. The Hazare and Shiites are killed very often in this city. In general, the life of the educated Hazare in this area is very much in danger and he belongs to this educated class. Several thousand Hazare would have been killed in this area between 2000 and 2001.

Eight Hazars were killed on March 29, 2012, after which another 15-20 Hazars have been killed to this day. Injured persons would not appear in the statistics. There is a page on the Internet where you can read what is happening with the Hazare there.

The BF once sat in a large vehicle, a van. On the XXXX, on a Saturday, around 8 a.m. he would have wanted to drive towards the bazaar. While the car was waiting for passengers, a girl came and said she was in a hurry to come for an exam. The BF therefore got out and gave her his place. The BF then took a taxi in which other people would have been. The van that the BF left was then shot at. Eleven people were killed and one person was wounded. Ten minutes later, the BF and the other people had reached the site of the attack. The BF himself saw how many people died there.

The BF was also a teacher and trainer. He completed a course in the USA and also worked at a university in Karachi. The BF trained people in different cities. He then received two phone calls threatening the BF that he should no longer work for these organizations. This also affected his work at the university. There were many fundamentalists in the area and they did not want the BF to work for these organizations. In XXXX 2011 the BF had come to the conclusion that the attack on the van was actually aimed at the BF, they wanted to kill the BF. Two days after the attack, a plainclothes policeman came and wanted to know why the BF had left the van before the attack. There are two options. You are simply accused by the police of being involved in the matter or you are directly linked to the attack. In addition, two plainclothes police officers came to the BF's house three evenings in a row and asked where the BF was. He was then in Karachi. After the phone calls and the attack, the BF himself concluded that he could become a victim of an attack. He was not able to stay in another part of Pakistan because he was afraid that the police would betray the BF to the terrorists (AS 53 ff).

On April 26, 2012, the authority concerned received a written statement from the BF and documents relating to the BF. In summary, it was stated that the BF was not an Afghan but a Pakistani citizen and thus the country findings on Afghanistan would not affect the BF. He would have already presented a copy of his Pakistani passport and would now like to present his Pakistani identity card, his student ID, a confirmation that the BF was naturalized in District XXXX and various school and university diplomas. His reasons for fleeing relate to Pakistan. As Hazara in the border region around XXXX, because of his ethnicity, and in particular because of his high level of education, he is at risk of asylum-relevant He requests that this argument be examined.

I.2. The BF's application for international protection was consequently rejected by decision of the Federal Asylum Office (hereinafter referred to as "BAA") dated September 24, 2012, No. 11 15.120-BAG, in accordance with Section 3 (1) AsylG 2005 and the status of person entitled to asylum was not granted (point I .). According to § 8 Paragraph 1 AsylG, the status of beneficiary of subsidiary protection was not granted in relation to the country of origin Afghanistan (point II.). Pursuant to Section 10, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Asylum Act 2005 [as amended before the Federal Law, Federal Law Gazette I No. 87/2012, note], the BAA expelled the BF from the Austrian federal territory to Afghanistan.

I.2.1. The BAA determined that the BF was an Afghan citizen and had not asserted a threat situation for Afghanistan.

I.2.2. Basically, the BAA stated that the BF had dishonestly acquired Pakistani citizenship when he was a child and that the BF was therefore to be assumed to be Afghan nationality. For Afghanistan, however, no grounds for asylum were asserted by the BF (AS 121 ff).

I.3. In a letter dated October 9, 2012, the BF filed a timely complaint against the decision of the authority in question and opposed the decision on the grounds that the evidence presented showed that the BF was a Pakistani citizen and that he also came from Pakistan. His country of origin is Pakistan, so the claim about granting subsidiary protection and expulsion is not lawful. The authority concerned would have had the opportunity to conduct research on site. Without further inquiries, the authorities concerned should not have assumed that the passport contained incorrect data and that the BF had not been renamed.

The applications were made

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to conduct an oral complaint hearing,

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to grant subsidiary protection in any case,

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not to expel the BF to Afghanistan and also not to Pakistan.

I.4. In dealing with the complaint raised by the BF, the Asylum Court resolved the contested decision on June 20, 2013, Zl the BAA back.

I.4.1. The Asylum Court found the first instance procedure to be inadequate and stated in the reasoning that there was a lack of explanations or investigations as to whether the BF actually still had Afghan nationality.

I.5. In a brief dated January 22, 2014, the BF lodged a complaint with the Federal Administrative Court in accordance with Article 130, Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the Federal Constitutional Court on the grounds that the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum had violated its duty to make a decision. The reason given was that since the BFA was again obliged to make a decision, the six-month decision period of Section 73 (1) AVG had expired. An application was made that the Federal Administrative Court should recognize the default complaint in the matter itself and grant the application for asylum and that the BF should be granted the status of the person entitled to asylum, if necessary that of the person entitled to subsidiary protection.

I.6. A query response of the state documentation initiated by the BAA showed that - should it be proven that the citizenship had been obtained through fraud - the citizenship of the person concerned (not just the "initiating" father) would be deprived of their citizenship. However, there is an extraordinary frequency of forged documents in Pakistan, including on citizenship ("Paper Citizen"), and some Pakistani parties would also try to address them as voters (AS

257 - 277).

I.7. The BF's application for international protection was consequently rejected with the decision of the now competent Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (hereinafter: BFA) in accordance with Section 3 (1) AsylG 2005 (point I). According to Section 8 (1) AsylG, the BF was granted subsidiary protection status (point II). In accordance with Section 8 (4) AsylG, the BF was granted a temporary residence permit until March 19, 2015 (AS 297 - 327).

I.7.1. The BFA has now established the BF's Pakistani citizenship. The BFA found the reasons for escape put forward by the BF to be implausible and assumed that there had been no acts of persecution directed against the BF. The authorities concerned made detailed, up-to-date findings on the asylum and deportation-related situation in Pakistan and, in the event of the BF's return to Pakistan, determined that the BF, as a Hazara with a higher level of education, could be exposed to a higher risk than the other Hazara in Pakistan ( AS 306 - 323).

I.7.2. From a legal point of view, the authority in question stated that no facts to be subsumed under Art. 1 Section A Number 2 of the GKF could be made credible. The status of beneficiary of subsidiary protection was to be granted to the BF in accordance with Section 8, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Asylum Act, since, due to his ethnic origin and higher level of education, he could have made an increased risk credible and his removal from the country would mean a violation of Art. 3 ECHR (AS 323 - 326).

I.7.3. The notification was delivered on March 24, 2014 (AS 347).

I.8. A complaint was made against ruling point I (non-recognition of the status of the person entitled to asylum) of the decision mentioned in the ruling by the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, which is now responsible, with a written statement in the file within an open period.

Essentially, in accordance with the previous submissions, it was stated that the BF, Hazara and citizen of Pakistan, fled to Pakistan with his family at the age of two and last worked as a teacher in XXXX. He was oriented towards the West, received training in teacher training in the USA and subsequently worked in teacher training in Pakistan. Fundamentalists had asked him to give up his work as a teacher trainer and, since he had not complied with this request, he had been the target of a bomb attack, which he had only escaped with luck. He then left Pakistan. Because of his Shiite-Islamic belief and because of his activity in teacher training, he is at risk, since strictly religious Sunni-Islamic groups do not want any western-oriented schools or Shiites. Teachers in particular are regularly killed in Pakistan. The BF has two characteristics that lead to a risk for religious reasons or as a member of a social group. (AS 348-353).

I.9. On September 24th, 2014, the judging court invited the parties to an oral hearing. Together with the summons, findings on the Hazara situation and on the situation in Pakistan relevant to asylum and deportation were sent to the BF. He was also maneuvered with regard to his obligation to participate in the procedure and asked to submit means of certification.

I.10. In a letter dated August 29, 2014, the authority concerned announced that it was not possible for an informed representative to participate in the negotiation for official and personal reasons. Regardless of this, due to the existing file situation, the rejection of the complaint in question was requested and the negotiation minutes were requested to be sent.

I.11. On September 24, 2014, an oral complaint hearing took place before the Federal Administrative Court, in which the BF had the opportunity to comment on his reasons for fleeing.

I.11.1. In addition to his previous submissions, the BF stated that he had been employed as a teacher and trainer in Pakistan and had also obtained a diploma in the USA. After returning to Pakistan, he was threatened by fundamentalists. An NGO called XXXX made it possible for him to stay in the USA from XXXX to XXXX. In 2010 he started working with NGOs and trained teachers in different cities. In addition, in Austria, XXXX, he took part in two demonstrations against the murder of the Hazara in XXXX and XXXX 2013 and presented photos as proof of this. His wife was pregnant at the time of his departure and he now also has a daughter. He himself is healthy and lives on social support in Austria [Ordnungszahl (OZ) 13].

I.12. In a letter dated December 19, 2014, the BF was informed of the reporting situation on activities in exile politics, with a two-week period for comments as part of the pending complaint procedure (OZ 15).

I.12.1. According to the report by the Foreign Office of April 8, 2014, no cases have so far become known in which an exile political activity would have led to state repression.

I.13. In its statement, the BF referred to the constant danger to the Hazara (Shiites) in Pakistan (OZ 16).

I.14. With regard to the course of the proceedings in detail, reference is made to the contents of the file.

II. The Federal Administrative Court has considered:

1. Findings:

II.1.1. The complainant

The BF is a male, Pakistani citizen who comes from the province of Balochistan, speaks the languages ​​Dari, Urdu and English, belongs to the Hazara ethnic group and professes the Shiite faith. The BF is a healthy, able-bodied person with sound training and professional experience.

The mother, wife and two children still live in the BF's country of origin.

The identity of the BF is certain.

The BF is criminally innocent.

II.1.2. The situation in the country of origin Pakistan

The following statements are made regarding the asylum and deportation-related situation in Pakistan:

Political situation

Pakistan is a federal state with the four provinces Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province) and the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" (FATA). The Pakistani constitution states that the laws passed by parliament in the FATA only apply if the President explicitly orders it. Pakistan also controls the areas of Gilgit-Baltistan (the former "Northern Areas") and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK - "Free Kashmir"), which are on the Pakistani side of the line of control between India and Pakistan Part of cashmere. Both areas are not officially counted as part of the Pakistani national territory. Gilgit-Baltistan received partial autonomy in September 2009. It had previously been ruled from Islamabad. AJK also enjoys autonomy, but is financially and politically dependent on the government in Islamabad (AA 10.2013a).

The Pakistani population is estimated by the CIA World Factbook as of July 2013 at over 193 million. Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world (CIA 9/11/2013).

The legislative power in Pakistan rests with Parliament. The parliament consists of two chambers, the National Assembly and the Senate. Provincial assemblies are also elected in the provinces of Pakistan. The National Assembly has 342 members. 60 seats are reserved for women and another 10 for representatives of religious minorities. The legislative period lasts five years (AA 10.2013a).

In XXXX 2010, a far-reaching constitutional reform was passed that had been prepared by a bipartisan parliamentary committee since June 2009. The aim was to return to the basic form of the constitution adopted under President Zulfikar A. Bhutto in 1973, which had been changed almost beyond recognition after numerous interventions by the military rulers Zia-ul Haq and Musharraf. The core elements of the constitutional amendments that have been made are a strengthening of the position of the Prime Minister while at the same time limiting the powers of the President, a strengthening of federalism through a significant expansion of the powers of the provinces, a strengthening of the independence of the judiciary through a new appointment procedure for the highest judges and the introduction of two new fundamental rights: the right to information and the right to education (AA 10.2013a).

The turnout in the parliamentary elections on May 11, 2013 was surprisingly high.In many constituencies, the bars stayed open longer because of the huge onslaught. There were an unusually large number of young voters and women among those waiting. An election worker at a girls' school in Rawalpindi that has been converted into a polling station said she had never seen such a high turnout in her long career. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan once again called for an election boycott on Friday (NZZ May 11, 2013). The TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), allied with Al-Qaeda, considers the election to be un-Islamic and announced suicide attacks for election day. The election therefore took place under great security precautions, more than 620,000 police officers, paramilitaries and soldiers were on duty (Die Zeit, May 11, 2013). Around a third of the constituencies were classified as risky. A parliamentary election in Pakistan has never been as bloody as this one. But the voters have proven that democracy is important to them and that they are not intimidated by extremists (NZZ May 11, 2013).

Threats from the Taliban had weakened the election campaigns of the ANP, the PPP (Pakistan People's Party), and the MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement). A Taliban spokesman warned Pakistani voters to stay away from these secular parties' events. All three parties are secular and were in the governing coalition. The ANP, which led the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was hardest hit. The restricted access to the voters as a result of the threats made it difficult for these parties to compensate for the unpopularity they had acquired during their reign (BBC April 5, 2013).

According to data from the PIPS security institute, a total of 170 people died in Pakistan between January 1 and May 15 in 148 attacks that specifically targeted political leaders, political activists, candidates, party offices and polling stations. The main burden of the attacks was carried by the ANP, which ruled until the interim government in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and was part of the national government coalition, with 37 attacks, followed by independent candidates, the PPP and the MQM, which ruled in Karachi. The conservative parties were not spared, however, activists and candidates of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the Islamist Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami, Jamaat-e-Islami, Balochish nationalist parties and some smaller parties were also affected by attacks, somewhat less often (PIPS 5.2013).

In the elections, the previous ruling party Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was replaced by the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) under Nawaz Sharif. The PML-N achieved an absolute majority of the seats in the elections. The second strongest party in the National Assembly was the former ruling party PPP, closely followed by the PTI of former cricket star Imran Khan. The MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement), with its strongholds in the two major cities of the Sindh province, Karachi and Hyderabad, is now the fourth largest group in parliament. On June 5, 2013, Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime Minister by parliament. It was the first time in Pakistan's history that a civilian government could rule for a full legislative period (2008-2013) and that democratic change was constitutional (AA 10.2013a). Pakistan only returned to democratic conditions in autumn 2008 after the military ruler Musharraf, who had ruled since 1999, left the country to forestall impeachment proceedings (AA November 2, 2012).

Also on May 11, 2013, the elections for the four provincial assemblies took place. In Punjab, the most populous province (approx. 50% of the population of Pakistan), the PML-N won more than two thirds of the mandates. In Sindh the PPP was able to defend its supremacy, in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa the PTI won most of the mandates and now leads a coalition government there. The government of Balochistan is now led by a chief minister of the Baloch nationalist party NP, which has entered into a coalition with the PML-N and other parties (AA 10.2013a).

On July 30, 2013, both houses of parliament and members of the provincial parliaments elected the PML-N politician XXXX as the new Pakistani head of state by a large majority, who was sworn in on September 9, 2013. XXXX replaces Asif Ali Zardari in the office of President, who was the first head of state in Pakistan's history to end his term of office in an orderly manner. The constitutional transfer of power both in government and in the office of head of state has considerably strengthened democracy in Pakistan (AA 10.2013a).

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has declared economic and financial issues as well as improving relations with the neighboring states of Afghanistan and India to be the priorities of his term of office. Just a few months after he took office, however, the security situation in Pakistan, and in particular the threat posed by the Islamist extremists of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), are coming to the fore again. An all-party conference on September 9, 2013 mutually mandated the government to enter into talks with the Taliban. However, this dialogue approach was called into question only a few days after the conference by several bloody Taliban attacks (AA 10.2013a).

Security situation

Pakistan is confronted with a significant terrorist threat from the Taliban and other jihadist groups, which have become the main threat to the country in recent years (AA November 2, 2012). The Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Balochistan Liberation Army and other armed groups target security forces and civilians, including members of religious minorities, aid workers, activists and journalists (AI 5.2013; see USDOS 19.4.2013). The western border areas with Afghanistan - Balochistan, the FATA (Federal Administered Tribal Areas) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa - have suffered from violence between militants and government forces for years (Reuters April 11, 2013).

In recent years, Taliban groups in parts of the tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan had established their own structures of rule and enforced their extremely conservative interpretation of Sharia law. Essential human rights and fundamental freedoms are violated in these areas. There are also repeated clashes with Lashkars (vigilante groups of the tribes) (AA 2.11.2012). Attracting tribal militias who violate human rights to achieve military goals has come at the expense of the rights of IDPs and other citizens (Brookings Institution 2011/11).

The main focus of the army is increasingly on the fight against the Taliban and other jihadist groups. Since the end of XXXX 2009, the military clashes between the Pakistani military and the Taliban have intensified. The Taliban had previously used an agreement with the provincial government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in February 2009 to take control of the Swat Valley and then advance to two neighboring districts. With an offensive in XXXX 2009, the army ended the Taliban rule in the Swat Valley. From XXXX to December 2009, the Taliban were expelled from South Waziristan (FATA), a region they had controlled for years (AA 10.2013a; see Reuters 11.4.2013). Most of the Taliban fighters have moved to more remote areas of the so-called "tribal areas". At the same time, in 2009 they hit Pakistan with a wave of terrorist attacks, most of which were directed against facilities of the security forces (army, police and ISI), but which also killed many bystanders (AA 2.11.2012).

The Pakistani government is facing major challenges in this dispute: On the one hand, in order to consolidate the military successes and prevent a return of the Taliban, functioning civil administrative structures must be established in the reclaimed areas, this applies above all to the legal system. In addition, the large number of internally displaced persons must be dealt with and the economic development of these areas promoted (AA 10.2013a). After all, the spread of the Taliban in the border areas is attributed to years of neglect and poor governance, as well as to the insecurity in Afghanistan (Reuters 11.4.2013).

In addition, battles continue to take place in parts of the FATA (AA 10.2013a). The army is conducting military operations here to drive out the Taliban and al Qaeda militants. This continues to drive people out of FATA, including from areas that have been officially declared liberated from militants (Reuters 04/11/2013).

The government's strategy is to inform the population of the agency or region concerned shortly before military operations against the Taliban, which means that the agency is "notified". After the military operations, the zone is "denotified" and thus declared safe for return by the military and thus released for return. In this process, the military is working together with the civil authorities, some of whom will assist with the return (BAA 6.2013).

The Taliban continue to react to the military operations with terrorist attacks, which particularly affect Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA, but which are also directed against targets in major Pakistani cities such as Karachi, Lahore and Faisalabad (AA 10.2013a; cf. Reuters 11.4.2013 ). The regional focus of terrorist attacks, however, is very clearly in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the tribal areas FATA and in Balochistan; Most of the victims are to be mourned there (AA October 24, 2013; see Reuters April 11, 2013). The attacks are primarily aimed at military and police facilities. But victims are also political opponents of the Taliban, religious minorities, Shiites and Muslims who do not follow the Taliban's strictly conservative Sharia interpretation, such as the Sufis (AA 10.2013a).

In 2011 there were 1,966 terrorist attacks in Pakistan with 2,391 fatalities. Combined terrorist attacks, military operations, drones, ethno-political violence, inter-tribal violence and cross-border violence, 7,107 people were killed in 2,985 incidents in Pakistan in 2011. The incidents of violence fell by 12% compared to 2010 (22% compared to 2009) and the death toll by 29% (PIPS 4.1.2012).

In 2012, militant nationalist and sectarian groups in Pakistan carried out 1,577 terrorist attacks, killing 2,050 people; 501 attacks left no victims. In 202 sectarian acts of terrorism directed against other Muslim denominations by various groups, such as the TTP (Tehreek-i Taliban), 537 people were killed (PIPS January 4, 2013).

Terrorist attacks, operations by the security forces and their clashes with militants, ethnopolitical violence, drone attacks, violence between tribes and between militants, interreligious clashes, religious-communal violence, cross-border clashes and attacks as well as clashes between criminal gangs or between them and the police In total, 5,047 people were killed in 2,217 such violent incidents in 2012. The trend of a decline in the number of incidents of violence and death, which began in 2010, continued in 2011 and 2012 (PIPS 4/4/2013).

Targeted attacks on people or groups who speak out against the TTP continued. In addition to funeral parades, mosques have also increasingly become targets of attacks, which are visited by members of pro-government militias. The attacks are concentrated in the province of Khyber-Pashtunistan (KPK) and the FATA (HSS 5.4.2012). In the third quarter of 2012, the TTP expanded its attacks on Pakistani security forces and their facilities. There are attacks not only in the predominantly affected province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, but also in other parts of the country. Shiites are still the target of attacks (HSS 10/10/2012).

The terrorists' tactics were diverse; the largest proportion of all attacks, 587 and 37 percent, respectively, were targeted killings (this figure does not include 177 politically motivated targeted killings). Other significant tactics included improvised explosive devices (375) and remote-controlled bombs (139) (PIPS January 4, 2013).

By the end of 2012, incidents of terrorism and violence, terrorist attacks and the number of victims had declined overall. State measures in some critical regions improved the situation. The success of the military operations can be seen in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan. Some senior Taliban leaders fell victim to the US drone strikes on the border with Afghanistan, damaging the extremists' strategic capabilities in particular. The population is fed up with the militants. The state is taking action against the militants, and there is no broader, consistent strategy for a substantial improvement in uncertainties. The district-by-district analysis of the digital database shows, however, that the red zones, those districts that are affected by a high number of security-relevant incidents of violence, have declined over the past few years (BAA 6.2013).

The security structure, which for a long time did not want to recognize the growing influence of extremists on the country, now sees it formally as a threat. However, there is a lack of coordination and trust between the individual authorities. Public opinion is still divided on how to deal with the terrorists in the tribal areas. Nevertheless, the military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan reduced the terror threat. The rise in violence between Muslim faiths remains serious security challenges; the heightened ethnopolitical tensions in Karachi; the TTP and its allies; the situation in Balochistan (PIPS 4.1.2013).

The government is taking some measures to protect the population. The Pakistani military carried out anti-terrorism measures in the FATA (USDOS April 19, 2013). 107 operational military strikes were carried out in this region in 2012. PIPS recorded 79 search operations against terrorists in 2012 across the country, 27 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 24 in FATA, eleven in Balochistan and four in Sindh. Large amounts of explosives, suicide jackets and weapons were found. 1,287 suspected militants were arrested in 2012, but only a few of them were convicted. Suspects are often arrested without a trial or released due to a lack of evidence (PIPS January 4, 2013). Measures have also been taken to weaken links between the terrorists and prevent recruitment from militant organizations. Large arsenals were dug up in urban areas such as Islamabad and Karachi, gang members and TTP commanders who provided logistical support for militants in tribal areas were arrested in Karachi, suicide bombers were arrested before the crime and attack plans foiled (USDOS April 19, 2013) . At least 14 attacks were also foiled in August 2013, for example (PIPS 9/11/2013). Another way of combating this is to control and curtail the international flow of money to these organizations (BAA 6.2013).

However, the pre-election time was marked by an above-average level of terrorist violence. Militant forces tried to destabilize the political situation in order to prevent the elections. Attacks and assassinations culminated in a wave of violence as early as the end of 2012. Although at the end of November the security measures on the occasion of the Ashura festival were increased to an exceptionally large extent across the country, there were numerous attacks in which dozens of people died (BAA 6.2013). At least 75 people died in attacks in the penultimate week of 2012 in a nationwide wave of violence. Observers link the dramatic increase in violence to the parliamentary elections. In the fourth quarter of 2012, too, many attacks were related to the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. Most of the attacks occurred in Karachi, but numerous people also died in Balochistan Province (HSS January 17, 2013).

The rise in violence continued in 2013. The first two months of 2013 also recorded an exceptionally high increase in interdenominational violence (BAA 6/2013). At least 92 dead, including 86 members of the Shiite Hazara minority, resulted in a double attack in a billiard hall in a Hazara district of the Balochian provincial capital XXXX on January 10th. The attack, to which the Sunni extremist group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi claimed responsibility, was the worst in almost two years and the bloodiest attack on the Shiite minority in Pakistan so far (BAA 6/2013; see Spiegel 11.1.2013, Dawn 11.1.2013b) . A total of 215 attacks with 321 deaths were recorded by PIPS in January (PIPS February 13, 2013; note; scientific institute - for methodology, see BAA 6.2013). After its final evaluation, the NGO CRSS stated the number of deaths from various types of security-related violence for January as 591 (CRSS 25.9.2013).

For February 2013, PIPS recorded 129 terrorist attacks with 247 deaths and a total of 492 deaths in 183 different relevant incidents of violence in Pakistan. Sectarian attacks increased in February, mainly in XXXX and Karachi (PIPS 3/11/2013). After the final evaluation, CRSS stated the number of deaths from security-related violence for February as 454 (CRSS 25.9.2013).In a renewed attack alone in an enclave in XXXX predominantly inhabited by Shiite Hazara, at least 84 people died on February 16. There were widespread protests (BAA 6th 2013; see NYT 2/17/2013).

After the peak in January and February, this interdenominational category of terror decreased in the next two months, in XXXX the number fell significantly. Nonetheless, another of the larger attacks in the pre-election period on March 3 also hit the Shiite minority, this time in Karachi, 48 people died in an attack on a Shiite neighborhood (BAA 6/2013). According to PIPS, a total of 152 terrorist attacks were carried out across Pakistan in March, killing 220, and a total of 206 reported incidents of violence with 504 deaths. The increase is mainly due to the nationalist violence in Balochistan and the Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (PIPS April 11, 2013). According to the final analysis, CRSS gives the number of deaths from violent incidents for March as 570 (CRSS 25.9.2013).

In XXXX, PIPS recorded 198 attacks with 183 deaths, a total of 404 people died in 253 relevant security incidents in Pakistan. Corresponding to the pre-election time, a high proportion (56 attacks) were on political targets - political parties, candidates, election campaign offices and election events (PIPS 8 May 2013). The CRSS gives the number of deaths through violence for XXXX as 429 (CRSS 25.9.2013).

In May, the PIPS reported 197 terrorist attacks across Pakistan with 242 deaths, and all security-related violent incidents together resulted in 514 deaths (PIPS 13.6.2013). CRSS speaks of 622 deaths from violence in May (CRSS 25.9.2013). The civilian victims included a large number of political candidates, political activists and supporters from all parties (CRSS 06/18/2013; see PIPS 06/13/2013).

According to data from the PIPS security institute, 170 people died in a total of 148 attacks specifically targeting political leaders, political activists, candidates, party offices and polling stations between January 1 and May 15 in Pakistan, most of them in XXXX and May. In addition to terrorist attacks, 97 incidents of violence and clashes between activists and supporters of different parties were recorded during the same period, in which 128 people died (PIPS 5.2013).

In June, PIPS counted 130 attacks with 283 deaths and a total of 202 incidents of violence with 510 deaths (PIPS 8 July 2013). CRSS reports 616 deaths from violence in June (CRSS 25.9.2013).

For July, PIPS recorded 122 attacks that killed 208 people. A total of 399 deaths were found in 179 different incidents of violence (PIPS 8/8/2013). According to the evaluation, the number of deaths from violence by CRSS is given as 572 for July (CRSS 25.9.2013).

For August, PIPS reports a total of 124 terrorist attacks with 171 deaths. All security-related violence taken together died in 227 violent incidents, 272 people (PIPS 11.9.2013). CRSS recorded 432 deaths in various types of violence in August (CRSS 9/25/2013). Overall, there was a sharp decline in incidents of violence in August 2013, while the decline in violence, which rose sharply in the election year, began in June. Violence fell sharply in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, but it increased sharply in Balochistan and Sindh (Karachi) (CRSS September 25, 2013; see PIPS September 11, 2013).

In September, the number of victims in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa rose sharply due to two large attacks in Peshawar. A total of 135 attacks with 270 deaths were recorded across the country in September, with a total of 380 deaths in all 219 incidents of violence (PIPS October 14, 2013). The CRSS researched 493 fatalities (CRSS October 21, 2013).

In 2013, schools and other infrastructure facilities in the FATA, in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were repeatedly destroyed (e.g. CRSS February 11, 2013). In addition, in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, Balochistan and Karachi in 2013, there were repeated armed clashes between security forces and militants (e.g. PIPS May 8, 2013).

Swell:

AA - Foreign Office (November 2nd, 2012): Report on the asylum and deportation-related situation in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

AA - Federal Foreign Office (10.2013a): Pakistan, state building / domestic policy,

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Pakistan/innenpolitik_node.html#doc344388bodyText3, accessed October 14, 2013

AA - Foreign Office Germany (October 24, 2013): Pakistan - Travel and Security Advice (Partial Travel Warning) http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Laenderinformationen/00-SiHi/PakistanSicherheit.html, accessed October 24, 2013

AI - Amnesty International (5.2013): Annual Report 2013, The state of the world's human rights, Pakistan, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/pakistan/report-2013, accessed September 2, 2013

BAA - Federal Asylum Office (6/2013): Report on the Fact Finding Mission Pakistan from 8-16 March 2013 with a focus on the security situation, religious minorities, land rights, medical and social care, Afghan refugees

Brookings Institution (11.2011): From Responsibility to Response:

Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/11/responsibility%20response%20ferris/from%20responsibility%20to%20response%20nov%202011doc.pdf , Accessed October 19, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (February 11, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (January 2013), http://crss.pk/story/3868/pakistan-conflict-tracker-monthly-report-january-2013/, accessed on 29.9.2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (June 18, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (May 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4397/pakistan-conflict-tracker-monthly-report-may-2013/, accessed on September 22, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (25.9.2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (August 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4756/monthly-report-august-2013/, accessed on September 30, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (October 21, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (September 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4871/monthly-report-september-2013/, accessed on October 23, 2013

Dawn (11.1.2013b): Desperate Hazaras want army rule in XXXX, http://dawn.com/2013/01/12/relatives-refuse-to-bury-blast-victims-hold-sit-in-with-coffins -desperate-hazaras-want-army-rule-in-XXXX /, accessed on October 13, 2013

HSS - Hanns Seidel Foundation (January 17, 2013): Quarterly report, Pakistan IV / 2012,

http://www.hss.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/QB/Pakistan_QB_2012_IV.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2013

HSS - Hanns Seidel Foundation (April 5, 2012): Quarterly Report, Pakistan I / 2012,

http://www.hss.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/QB/Pakistan_QB_2012_I.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2013

HSS - Hanns Seidel Foundation (10.10.2012): Quarterly report, Pakistan III / 2012,

http://www.hss.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/QB/Pakistan_QB_2012_III.pdf, accessed October 5, 2013

NYT - New York Times (February 17, 2013): Shiite Protesters Demand Arrests After Deadly Bombing in Pakistan, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/world/asia/explosion-in-crowded-market-kills -dozens-in-pakistan.html? partner = rss & emc = rss & _r = 0, accessed on October 18, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (5.2013): Elections 2013:

Violence against Political Parties, Candidates and Voters

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (4.1.2012): Pakistan Security Report 2011, http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=108.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (4.1.2013): Pakistan Security Report 2012,

http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr_list_1, accessed on October 13, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (February 13, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (January 2013), http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=315, accessed October 4, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (March 11, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (February 2013), http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=320, accessed October 20, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (April 11, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (March 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=325, accessed on 29.9.2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (8 May 2013): Pakistan Security Report (XXXX 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=328, accessed on October 22, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (13.6.2013): Pakistan Security Report (May 2013)

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=334, accessed on September 18, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (8 July 2013): Pakistan Security Report (June 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=337; Accessed September 16, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (8/8/2013): Pakistan Security Report (July 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=345, accessed on October 14, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (11.9.2013): Pakistan Security Report (August 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=350, accessed on 29.9.2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (October 14, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (September 2013), http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=360, accessed October 15, 2013

Reuters (April 11, 2013): Pakistan violence, http://www.trust.org/spotlight/Pakistan-violence, accessed September 21, 2013

Spiegel (11.1.2013): Sunnis confess to attacks in Pakistan,

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/sunnitische-terrorgruppe-bebekannt-sich-zu-anschlaegen-in-pakistan-a-876945.html, accessed on September 22, 2013

USDOS - US Department of State (April 19, 2013): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2012 - Pakistan, http://www.refworld.org/docid/517e6df418.html, accessed October 15, 2013

Regional distribution of violence

The different provinces suffer from different forms and intensities of violence. The activities of the Taliban groups are mainly limited to the northwest of Pakistan, although they have also become visible in the economic metropolis of Karachi in recent years (CRSS 13.7.2013). The western border areas are plagued by violence. The areas most affected are Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA, which have a strong Taliban presence, and Balochistan, where tribal militant groups are perpetrating acts of insurrectionary violence. The rest of Pakistan is affected by sporadic terrorist attacks, with some of the militant violence spilling into other parts of Pakistan with suicide attacks in the cities and armed attacks on the military (Reuters 04/11/2013 cf. AA 10/24/2013).

Overall, the security situation therefore diverges greatly between and within individual provinces. The representative of the PIPS explains that the most populous province of Punjab with around 90 million inhabitants can be classified as safe, Sindh is also safe, with the exception of Karachi, which is a hotspot of violence, and terrorist groups are trying to infiltrate the inner Sindh . Islamabad is also considered to be relatively safe. But attacks also occur in these areas. The Pashtun areas in Balochistan are relatively safe, the Baloch areas are extremely unsafe. The security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is critical - only a few districts are safe, while others have suffered severe attacks. Balochistan, FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the metropolis of Karachi are thus the critical areas of Pakistan (BAA 6/2013). Balochistan, FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa accounted for 1,827 of a total of 1,966 terrorist attacks in 2011. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had the highest number of deaths with 890, the FATA with 675 the highest number of terrorist attacks (612 deaths). There were 640 attacks (710 dead) in Balochistan, 58 in Karachi, 21 in the other parts of Sindh Province, 30 in Punjab, 26 in Gilgit-Baltistan, 4 in Islamabad and none in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (PIPS 4.1.2012) .

In 2012, the highest number of terrorist attacks was reported from Balochistan, at 474. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA, which were hit by the Taliban and militants, were the second and third most explosive regions in the country with 456 and 388 terrorist attacks, respectively. 187 terrorist attacks were reported from Karachi and 28 from other parts of Sindh, 26 from Gilgit Baltistan, 17 from Punjab, one from Islamabad and none from Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Most of the fatalities occurred in the FATA and in Balochistan (631 deaths each). In 2012 there were 401 dead in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 272 in Karachi, 17 in inner Sindh, 75 in Punjab, 22 in Gilgit Baltistan, and one death in an attack in Islamabad (PIPS January 4, 2013). No attacks were recorded in 28 of 36 districts in Punjab in 2012 (BAA 6/2013).

The regional differentiation can also be seen in the increased violence associated with the 2013 elections. The FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, as well as Karachi (BAA 6/2013) were badly affected.

In the period between January and September 2013, PIPS recorded attacks and fatalities in Punjab, in Islambad, Sindh-Karachi, Khyber Pkt.Baluchistan, FATA, Azad Kashmir, Giligt-Balt.

June PIPS counted 130 attacks with 283 deaths and a total of 202 incidents of violence with 510 deaths (PIPS 8 July 2013). CRSS reports 616 deaths from violence in June (CRSS 25.9.2013). PIPS recorded 122 attacks that killed 208 people. A total of 399 deaths occurred in 179 different incidents of violence (PIPS 8/8/2013). According to the evaluation, the number of deaths due to violence by CRSS is given as 572 for July (CRSS 25.9.2013).

Of the specific attacks recorded on political activists, candidates or polling stations by PIPS from January 1 to May 15, 2013, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa accounted for the highest number of 50 (55 dead). 49 such attacks affected Balochistan (19 dead), 30 the Sindh (25 of them in Karachi; 60 dead), 12 the FATA (33 dead), 7 the Punjab (3 dead). The ANP and the PPP were attacked in almost every region, the MQM in Karachi. Of the 97 additional incidents of violence and clashes between activists and supporters of various parties from January 1 to May 15, 2013, the majority concerned Karachi (70 incidents / 90 deaths). 3 clashes with 7 dead were reported from the rest of Sindh, 9 with 4 dead from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 9 with 11 dead from Punjab and 6 with 16 dead from Balochistan (PIPS 5.2013).

Swell:

AA - Foreign Office Germany (October 24, 2013): Pakistan - Travel and Security Advice (Partial Travel Warning) http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Laenderinformationen/00-SiHi/PakistanSicherheit.html, accessed October 24, 2013

BAA - Federal Asylum Office (6/2013): Report on the Fact Finding Mission Pakistan from 8-16 March 2013 with a focus on the security situation, religious minorities, land rights, medical and social care, Afghan refugees

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (February 11, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (January 2013), http://crss.pk/story/3868/pakistan-conflict-tracker-monthly-report-january-2013/, accessed on 29.9.2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (March 13, 2013) Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (February 2013), http://crss.pk/story/3939/pakistan-conflict-tracker-monthly-report-february-2013/, Accessed September 20, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (April 19, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (March 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4028/pakistan-conflict-tracker-monthly-report-march-2013/, accessed on October 24, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (8.5.2013): Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (XXXX 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4100/pakistan-conflict-tracker-monthly-report-XXXX-2013/ , Accessed October 10, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (June 18, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (May 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4397/pakistan-conflict-tracker-monthly-report-may-2013/, accessed on September 22, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies Pakistan (July 13, 2013): Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (June 2013), http://crss.pk/?p=4555, accessed September 18, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (August 17, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (July 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4635/monthly-report-july-2013/, accessed on September 22, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (25.9.2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (August 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4756/monthly-report-august-2013/, accessed on September 30, 2013

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies (October 21, 2013):

Pakistan Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (September 2013), http://crss.pk/story/4871/monthly-report-september-2013/, accessed on October 23, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (4.1.2012): Pakistan Security Report 2011, http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=108.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (4.1.2013): Pakistan Security Report 2012,

http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr_list_1, accessed on October 13, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (February 13, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (January 2013), http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=315, accessed October 4, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (March 11, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (February 2013), http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=320, accessed October 20, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (April 11, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (March 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=325, accessed on 29.9.2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (8 May 2013): Pakistan Security Report (XXXX 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=328, accessed on October 22, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (13.6.2013): Pakistan Security Report (May 2013)

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=334, accessed on September 18, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (8 July 2013): Pakistan Security Report (June 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=337; Accessed September 16, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (8/8/2013): Pakistan Security Report (July 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=345, accessed on October 14, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (11.9.2013): Pakistan Security Report (August 2013),

http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=350, accessed on 29.9.2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (October 14, 2013): Pakistan Security Report (September 2013), http://san-pips.com/app/database/index.php?action=reports&id=360, accessed October 15, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (5.2013): Elections 2013:

Violence against Political Parties, Candidates and Voters

Reuters (April 11, 2013): Pakistan violence, http://www.trust.org/spotlight/Pakistan-violence, accessed September 21, 2013

Important terrorist groups

The Taliban and other militant organizations in Pakistan are active in internal conflicts, regional struggles (Afghanistan, Kashmir) and global jihad. They are loosely coordinated, but often share resources and recruits. Various militant groups have joined forces to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban (Reuters April 11, 2013). The TTP is the main contributor to instability in the country. In addition to security forces, the goals of the TTP are now also political leaders and peace activists. The TTP is struggling with internal crises. Their strength lies in the connection between external and internal terrorist groups. It also acts as a bridge between international (e.g. Al Qaeda) and local terrorist groups - from the Punjabi Taliban to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (PIPS 4.1.2013).

The TTP has at least 30,000 members (Reuters April 11, 2013). The representative of the PIPS explained that the TTP does not have a uniform structure and that the existing structure is no longer intact. Each group has its own operations. The violence emanating from the TTP concentrates regionally on the tribal areas, thematically on parties, pro-government tribes, ruling politicians, on pro-government elders, security forces, mosques that are visited by security forces or in which imams or mullahs support the government, Peace activists (such as Malala Yousafzai), military and police institutions, minorities and Muslims who do not follow their Sharia interpretation. Originally, Shiites in the tribal areas were not the target of the Taliban, but this has changed (BAA 6/2013). The Awami National Party was the main target of TTP violence, with some attacks targeting leaders and activists (PIPS January 4, 2013). The Taliban's activities are mainly limited to the northwest of Pakistan, but in recent years they have also become visible in the economic metropolis of Karachi (CRSS 7/13/2013, see Reuters 4/11/2013). Some Taliban groups have bases in Balochistan (Reuters April 11, 2013).

Since 2009, the TTP has also been using the kidnappings of "high profile" people (including rich businessmen, academics, Western aid workers and members of the military) in major Pakistani cities to raise funds (Reuters April 11, 2013). Three TTP members were arrested in Islamabad in July for blackmailing businessmen there and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This shows the blurring between criminal syndicates and religious militants (CRSS 7/13/2013).

Outside the TTP, there are local Taliban groups that are either loosely connected to the TTP or formed with similar goals. Most of these groups operate in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, mainly in Charsadda, Swabi, Nowshera and the periphery of Peshawar. However, many criminal groups also use this label. Most of these groups are small and their operations are limited to their environment (BAA 6.2013).

There are also Sunni terrorist groups in Punjab. One of these, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, aims to expel Shiites from Pakistan (Reuters 04/11/2013). It is fragmented into many groups, the tactics and objectives of which differ from one area to another. It is a locally oriented group; its targeting of Shiites, for example in Balochistan, is primarily directed against Hazara. The climax were the attacks in XXXX in January and February 2013 (approx. 200 deaths) (BAA 6.2013) The Punjabi Taliban are a separate group from the TTP, but they maintain ties to it. Their targets are mainly security forces and Shiites. They act like terrorist cells in Punjab, but they are currently not very active (BAA 6.2013).

The main actor in nationalist violence is the Balochistan Liberation Army. It is active in Balochistan, occasionally in Karachi and in the tribal areas of the neighboring southern Punjab. Other examples of Baloch terrorist organizations are Lashkar-e-Balochistan, the Balochistan Liberation Front, and the United Baloch Army. In 2012 Sindhi nationalist groups also carried out acts of terrorism inside Sindh (BAA 6/2013).

Swell:

BAA - Federal Asylum Office (6/2013): Report on the Fact Finding Mission Pakistan from 8-16 March 2013 with a focus on the security situation, religious minorities, land rights, medical and social care, Afghan refugees

BAA - Federal Asylum Office (January 31, 2011): Analysis of State Documentation - Afghanistan / Pakistan - Extremist groups in the Afghan-Pakistani border area

CRSS - Center for Research and Security Studies Pakistan (July 13, 2013): Conflict Tracker Monthly Report (June 2013), http://crss.pk/?p=4555, accessed September 18, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies: Pakistan Security Report 2012, 4.1.2013,

http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr_list_1, accessed on October 13, 2013

Reuters (April 11, 2013): Pakistan violence, http://www.trust.org/spotlight/Pakistan-violence, accessed September 21, 2013

Regional problem zone Balochistan

Balochistan comprises 31 districts. The population is around 8 million. In terms of area, it is the largest, but at the same time the least populated, least developed and poorest province of Pakistan. Several nationalist groups use terror to achieve independence (BAA 6.2013). For example, militant tribes are active in an uprising on a low-threshold level in order to gain greater control over resources (mineral resources) and political power or political autonomy (Reuters April 11, 2013).

Balochistan is one of the critical regions of Pakistan, especially the Balochian areas in Balochistan are extremely unsafe, while the Pashtun populated areas are somewhat safer. The highest number of terrorist attacks and fatalities was reported in 2012 from Balochistan, which has been a source of unrest for nationalist rebels and interdenominational violence for years. Separatist-nationalist and interdenominational violence has increased in Balochistan. 631 people were killed in 474 terrorist attacks in the region. The main actor of nationalist violence is the Balochistan Liberation Army. Other examples of Baloch terrorist organizations are Lashkar-e-Balochistan, Balochistan Liberation Front and United Baloch Army (BAA 6/2013). The main targets of these insurgents were security forces (30% of all attacks), non-Balochian settlers, pro-government tribal members and political activists, as well as infrastructure facilities such as gas pipelines, railroad tracks and electrical lines (PIPS January 4, 2013). The attacks on natural gas and power lines led to severe supply bottlenecks in the province. At least 280 people were killed or injured in religiously motivated attacks by the splinter group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other extremist groups on Shiites in 2011 (AI May 24, 2012).

In 2011, 615 of the 1,887 attacks by terrorist and extremist groups registered by HRCP took place in Balochistan (HRCP 3.2012; HRCP uses PIPS data for its 2012 annual report). PIPS reported 640 attacks with 710 deaths in 2011 (PIPS January 4, 2012).

A special target in Balochistan is the Shiite Hazara minority, where several categories of terror intersect (BAA 6.2013). Sunni extremist gunmen systematically attack members of the Hazara in XXXX. There were no arrests, which raises serious allegations against the government. The main mastermind is the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The fear campaign has forced many Hazara to retreat to ethnic enclaves on the outskirts of the city, where armed men stand guard on street corners (NYT December 3, 2012). The HRCP reports that more than 100 Hazara were killed in Balochistan in 2012 (HRCP 3/2013).

On January 10, 2013, at least 92 people, including 86 Shiite Hazara, died in an attack in XXXX. The Sunni extremist group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi claimed responsibility. Another attack in a predominantly Shiite Hazara enclave in XXXX killed at least 84 people on February 16 (BAA 6/2013). Another attack in Hazara Town in XXXX on June 30, 2013 (Dawn 1.7.2013) resulted in at least 28 deaths.

In November 2009 the government adopted a package of measures to improve the situation in Balochistan. This also includes the willingness to enter into dialogue with Baloch nationalists who went into exile because of the repression by the Musharraf government or who boycotted the elections in Balochistan. Nevertheless, there has not yet been any fundamental improvement in the political situation in Balochistan; the politically motivated acts of violence continue (AA 2.11.2012). The roadmap for resolving the conflict provides for the redistribution of raw materials. However, military controls continue, accompanied by regular reports on human rights violations (Reuters 04/11/2013).

After the national elections, the new Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif nominated the Baloch nationalist Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch of the National Party as Chief Minister of Balochistan, although the PML-N won a majority in the provincial assembly of Balochistan in the elections. The appointment is seen as an important step in Nawaz Sharif's stabilization efforts (BAA 6.2013).

Swell:

AA - Foreign Office (November 2nd, 2012): Report on the asylum and deportation-related situation in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

AI - Amnesty International (May 24, 2012): Annual Report 2012 - Pakistan, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/pakistan/report-2012, accessed October 10, 2013

BAA - Federal Asylum Office (6/2013): Report on the Fact Finding Mission Pakistan from 8-16 March 2013 with a focus on the security situation, religious minorities, land rights, medical and social care, Afghan refugees

Dawn (1.7.2013): XXXX, Peshawar rocked by blasts: Suicide bomber kills 28 Hazara men and women,

http://beta.dawn.com/news/1021939/XXXX-peshawar-rocked-by-blasts-suicide-bomber-kills-28-hazara-men-and-women, accessed October 9, 2013

HRCP - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (3.2012): State of Human Rights in 2011,

http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/AR2011-A.pdf, accessed 10.10.2013

HRCP - Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (3.2013): State of Human Rights in 2012,

http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/AR2012.pdf, accessed on September 2, 2013

HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 31, 2013): World Report 2013 - Pakistan, http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/237129/360003_de.html, accessed October 15, 2013

NYT - New York Times (December 3, 2012): Pakistan Reels with Violence against Shiites,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/world/asia/pakistans-hazara-shiites-under-siege.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed 9.9.2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (4.1.2012): Pakistan Security Report 2011, http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=108.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2013

PIPS - Pak Institute for Peace Studies (4.1.2013): Pakistan Security Report 2012,

http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr_list_1, accessed on September 13, 2013

Reuters (April 11, 2013): Pakistan violence, http://www.trust.org/spotlight/Pakistan-violence, accessed September 21, 2013

Legal protection / judicial system

The judiciary has regained its independence and is making efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Pakistan (AA 2.11.2012). The Pakistani judiciary continued to maintain its independence from the government in 2012 (HRW January 31, 2013).

However, there are still significant weaknesses in the enforcement of current law. According to the "World Justice Project" index on the rule of law, Pakistan is one of the countries with major deficits in this area. Part VII of the constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, which has been politically strengthened, but is still inefficient overall and, above all, largely ineffective in the lower courts (AA 2.11.2012). In practice, the judiciary is often affected by external influences such as fear of repression in cases of terrorism. Many lower-level courts remain corrupt, inefficient, and victims of pressure from prominent wealthy, religious and political actors. The political appointment of judges increases the influence of the government on the judiciary (USDOS 19.4.2013).

The above-mentioned widespread corruption, especially among lower court instances in connection with outdated procedural law as well as overburdened and overburdened law enforcement authorities lead to a large number of unfinished business, long detentions without judicial proceedings or after wrongful judgments, since evidence is not possible (AA 2.11.2012; cf. USDOS 19.4 .2013). There were 1.6 million cases pending, according to the Chief Justice (USDOS 4/19/2013). Despite the adoption of the "National Judicial Policy" in 2009, the backlog of cases remained high at all levels, the problems of corruption and incompetence in the courts continue to be widespread (HRW January 31, 2013) and access to justice is cost-intensive and difficult (AA November 2, 2012 ; see HRW January 31, 2013). After all, the structure of the judiciary with different special courts (e.g. military, Sharia, to combat terrorism, etc.) is complex and is not felt to be accessible to everyone (AA 2.11.2012).

In January 2010 the "Public Defender and Legal Aid Office Act (PDLAOA) 2009" was passed. The law aims in particular to ensure that all defendants, regardless of their financial resources, have equal access to legal counsel in court and, if necessary, have a right to poor law. The law has not yet been implemented (AA 2.11.2012).

When dealing with non-political cases, the High Court of Justice and the Supreme Court are generally classified as reliable by the media and the public (USDOS April 19, 2013). The Supreme Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Justice Iftikar Chaudhry, who has been noticed in recent years through persistent prosecution of corruption allegations, no longer seems to spare high-ranking members of the Pakistani military and secret service. For the first time in Pakistan's multifaceted judicial history, the de facto immunity of army and military representatives is lifted and - with the former head of the Pakistani secret service (ISI) and the former commander in chief of the Pakistani army - generals are tried in public (HSS 10.10.2012) . In June 2012, in a controversial decision, the Supreme Court dismissed Prime Minister Gilani for refusing to call the Swiss authorities to investigate allegations of corruption against President Zardari. The Supreme Court was active in addressing the issue of government abuse in Balochistan. However, no senior military was held responsible for it. The use of suo motu [on its own initiative] judicial proceedings by the Supreme Court has been excessive. The Supreme Court and the Higher Provincial Courts met media criticism with threats of "disregard for the court" proceedings (HRW 31.1.2013).

In the civil, criminal and family court systems, there are public hearings, the presumption of innocence and the possibility of an appeal. Defendants have the right to be heard and consulted by a lawyer. The defendant must bear the costs of legal representation before the lower courts; in appeals courts, a lawyer can be made available at public expense. Defendants can interview witnesses, bring their own witnesses and evidence, and have legal access to evidence brought against them (USDOS 4/19/2013).

Courts often fail to protect the rights of religious minorities. Laws against blasphemy are used in a discriminatory way against Christians, Ahmadis and other religious minorities. Lower courts often do not require sufficient evidence in blasphemy cases, and some defendants or convicts spend years in prison before a higher court orders their release or overturns their guilty verdict (USDOS 4/19/2013).

In Pakistan, especially in feudal and tribal areas, there is an informal, parallel legal system, the Jirga and Panchayat system [informal assemblies of elders who decide on disputes]. It has no legal coverage and constitutional action can be taken against it. However, many people in rural areas make use of it because they distrust the courts or the police (Dawn March 29, 2013). The Panchayats or Jirgas are held by feudal landlords and local leaders in Sindh and Punjab and tribal leaders in Pashtun and Baloch areas, sometimes in disregard of the legal system (USDOS April 19, 2013).

However, the legal situation regarding the jirgas is unclear.Findings from the Supreme Court and other courts have declared them illegal. However, they have not defined what constitutes a jirga and have not established any penalties for attending such a council meeting. There is no specific law in the Pakistani law that would ban jirgas. Jirgas regularly pass judgments that constitute a crime in themselves, such as being allowed to kill someone. Even so, the authorities often shy away from taking action against these councils because they do not want to upset tribal communities in their traditions. Human rights activists strongly advocate criminalization of participation in jirgas that pronounce unlawful judgments and punishments. In March 2012, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court ordered the leadership of the provincial police to take action against Jirgas, who ordered forced marriages as compensation (LAT 1.8.2012).

The judiciary is increasingly taking action against the centuries-old tradition of the jirgas or panchayats. Jirgas are tolerated in most of the country but not recognized by the formal courts. Jirga decisions are not legally binding - except in the tribal regions on the Afghan border [FATA], as long as they are made according to the laws of that region - but are usually implemented by the village community. Jirga decisions are usually better obeyed than those made by the courts. If you don't obey you have to leave the village. In recent years, judges have begun to scrutinize the decisions of the mostly conservative and male-only jirgas, particularly punishments such as death, rape, and forced child marriages. Judges take action against Jirgas more and more often, also because the media report a lot about it. In addition, more and more people are turning to the courts because they hear of successful trials against Jirgas. Since 2005, 60 cases of forced marriages, which had been banned since 2004, but still widespread, have been repealed. However, since many Pakistanis support Jirgas because they trust them more than the courts, some NGOs believe that their system should be improved and the possibilities for punishment reduced instead of banning them (Reuters 14.3.2013).

The case law of the Supreme Court and the High Courts does not have jurisdiction over some areas that have other legal systems (USDOS 19.4.2013).

Swell:

AA - Federal Foreign Office (November 2nd, 2012): Report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan of November 2nd, 2012

Dawn (March 29, 2013): Jirga system and plight of women, http://dawn.com/2013/03/29/jirga-system-and-plight-of-women/, accessed September 23, 2013

HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 31, 2013): World Report 2013 - Pakistan, http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/237129/360003_de.html, accessed October 15, 2013

HSS - Hanns Seidel Foundation (10.10.2012): Quarterly report, Pakistan III / 2012,

http://www.hss.de/fileadmin/media/downloads/QB/Pakistan_QB_2012_III.pdf, accessed on August 27, 2013

LAT - Los Angeles Times (1.8.2012): Pakistan's tribal justice system: Often a vehicle for revenge, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/01/world/la-fg-pakistan-jirga-justice- 20120801, September 23, 2013

Reuters (March 14, 2013): In Pakistan, ancient and modern justice collide,

http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/03/13/pakistan-jirgas-idINDEE92C0HM20130313, accessed on 23.9.2013

USDOS - US Department of State (April 19, 2013): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2012 - Pakistan, http://www.refworld.org/docid/517e6df418.html, accessed October 15, 2013

Security authorities, including documents

Police responsibilities are shared between national and regional authorities. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) reports to the Ministry of the Interior. She is responsible for the areas of immigration; organized crime; Interpol; Fight against terrorism and drugs. The counter-terrorism division within the FIA ​​is the Counter Terrorism Wing (CTWI). The Pakistani intelligence services ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] and IB [Intelligence Bureau] are also active in this area. The drug control authority ANF is subordinate to its own ministry, the Ministry for Narcotics Control. However, other authorities (e.g. Custom or Frontier Corps) are also involved in the fight against drugs, although the competencies are not always clearly defined. The individual provinces have their own crime-fighting authorities. The FIA ​​is not authorized to issue instructions to these provincial authorities (AA 2.11.2012).

The efficiency of the work of the police is very different in each district and ranges from good to inefficient. Some members of the police committed human rights violations or allowed themselves to be influenced by political interests (USDOS April 19, 2013). The human rights violations that the security forces become are widespread (AI 5.2013). The poorly trained, low-paid and often inadequately equipped police, especially in the lower ranks, have no public reputation. The extremely high susceptibility to corruption contributes to this, as does frequent unlawful attacks (in 2011, 337 suspects were killed and 71 injured in 254 police operations) and the arrests and mistreatment of people taken into police custody. Illegal police custody - 174 cases were reported in 2010 - and ill-treatment by the police often go hand in hand to increase pressure on detainees or their relatives to obtain a speedy release by paying bribes. The police forces are often integrated into local power structures and are therefore unable to conduct impartial investigations. Criminal charges are often not even recorded and investigations are delayed (AA 2.11.2012). In addition to these allegations, there are also allegations of "making them disappear". In the tribal areas in the north-west of the country, security forces distort laws in order to evade courts (AI 5.2013). In counterterrorism operations, security forces regularly violate fundamental rights, and suspects are often arrested without charge or convicted without a fair trial. The army continues to deny lawyers, relatives, independent observers and humanitarian personnel access to people arrested during military operations (HRW 01/31/2013).

The police often fail to protect minority groups such as Christians, Ahmadis and Shiites from attacks. The frequent failures to punish abuses contribute to a climate of impunity. Internal investigations and punishments for abuses can be ordered by the inspector general, the district police officers, the "district Nazims", provincial interior ministers or provincial prime ministers, the interior minister, the prime minister and the courts. The executive and police officers can also recommend criminal prosecution in such cases, and the courts can order such. These mechanisms are also sometimes used in practice. There have been improvements in the professionalism of the police. As in the previous year, the regional government of Punjab carried out regular training and further education in technical skills and the protection of human rights at all levels of the police (USDOS April 19, 2013).

The Islamabad Capital Police set up a human rights unit to encourage residents to report human rights violations (in person, by phone or email). In addition, human rights officers and contacts from the community were posted in all police stations. They can visit police stations at any time, question prisoners and recommend disciplinary measures in the event of reports of abuses. Law enforcement bodies at the federal and provincial levels attended training courses on human, victim and women's rights. Between 2008 and 2010 the "Society for Human Rights and Prisoners' Aid" trained more than 2,000 police officers on human rights issues (USDOS 8/4/2011).

A "First Information Report" (FIR) is the legal basis for all imprisonment. The ability of the police to initiate an FIR themselves is limited. Often times, another person has to do this. It does not matter whether there is plausible evidence. An FIR allows the police to detain a suspect for 24 hours. An extension of the pre-trial detention for a further 14 days is possible after presentation to a police judge, if the police give valid reasons that such an extension is absolutely necessary for the investigation. Some do not adhere to this restriction. There are reports that state organs either issued an FIR without evidence or only after receiving a bribe (USDOS 4/19/2013).

The number of [Pakistani, in Germany] submitted documents with falsified or falsified content is high. It is easily possible in Pakistan to initiate (bogus) criminal proceedings against yourself in which the submitted documents (e.g. "First Information Report" or detention order) are genuine, but the proceedings have long been discontinued. Proceedings can be started again at any time with a simple application. It is also possible without great effort to have newspaper articles that describe a situation of persecution published for a fee or on the basis of relationships (AA 2.11.2012).

Swell:

AA - Foreign Office (November 2nd, 2012): Report on the asylum and deportation-related situation in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

AI - Amnesty International (5.2013): Annual Report 2013, The state of the world's human rights, Pakistan, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/pakistan/report-2013, accessed September 2, 2013

HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 31, 2013): World Report 2013 - Pakistan, http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/237129/360003_de.html, accessed October 15, 2013

USDOS - US Department of State (April 19, 2013): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2012 - Pakistan, http://www.refworld.org/docid/517e6df418.html, accessed October 15, 2013

USDOS - US Department of State (April 8, 2011): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010 - Pakistan, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4da56d9c8e.html, accessed October 15, 2013

Torture and Inhuman Treatment